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I. Background
Growing up in Montgomery, Alabama, Fred Gray expected to enter
the ministry. To that end, he left his hometown to enroll in a churchrelated high school called the Nashville Christian Institute. 1 There he
became a “boy preacher” who traveled around the country with the
Institute’s president on fund-raising and recruiting trips and served as
a part-time minister for area congregations. 2 He returned to Montgomery and graduated in 1951 from what was then the Alabama State
College for Negroes (now Alabama State University). While at Alabama
State, Fred Gray decided to become a lawyer who would “use the law
to ‘destroy everything segregated [he] could find.’” 3
Because Alabama was rigidly segregated at the time, Mr. Gray had
to attend law school elsewhere. The state, although unwilling to give
him a legal education within its borders, had a program that would
cover some of his expenses at an institution outside the South. These
arrangements almost certainly were unlawful even in 1951. 4 More interested in becoming a lawyer than in being a litigant and convinced
that the white power structure would prevent him from becoming a
lawyer if he challenged the admissions rules, he enrolled at what then
was called Western Reserve University in the fall of 1951. 5 After graduating in 1954, he returned home and was admitted to the Alabama bar. 6
Perhaps providentially for his goal of destroying everything segregated
he could find, less than a month before he graduated the Supreme Court

1.

Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride to Justice 7–8, 269 (rev. ed. 2013).

2.

Id. at 9, 270.

3.

Id. at 13. He did not abandon his interest in religion. During his college years,
he was a part-time minister at several churches in the Montgomery area;
while in law school he was assistant minister at a Cleveland church. Id. at
270–71. And after becoming a lawyer, he served as minister of churches in
Montgomery and Tuskegee for many years. Id. at 272–74.

4.

The separate-but-equal doctrine, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
was still in effect at the time. But under that rule, the Supreme Court had
held that states with whites-only law schools had to provide substantially
equal opportunities for legal education to persons of all races, see Sipuel v.
Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam), and had applied a rigorous
standard of substantial equality. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
And more than a dozen years before Mr. Gray entered law school, the Court
had rejected the kind of out-of-state subsidy that Alabama offered him. See
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).

5.

Gray, supra note 1, at 13–15.

6.

Id. at 27. Before sitting for the Alabama bar examination in July 1954, he
prudently sat for the Ohio bar in June just in case anything went wrong at
home. Id. at 22. He passed both tests. Id. at 27.

1026

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017
Introduction

issued its ruling against school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education. 7

II. Supreme Court Cases
In his first ten years as a lawyer, Fred Gray played a significant
role in four landmark Supreme Court cases. He also has handled numerous other civil rights cases for more than six decades. 8 Let us begin with
the Supreme Court cases before turning to other civil rights issues.
A. The Montgomery Bus Boycott: Gayle v. Browder 9

Fred Gray’s remarkable legal career effectively began with the December 1, 1955, arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to surrender her seat
on a Montgomery bus to a white passenger. Mr. Gray, who had not yet
reached his twenty-fifth birthday, represented her. 10 The arrest of Mrs.
Parks led to a 382-day boycott of the buses. 11 That protest movement
was coordinated by the newly created Montgomery Improvement Association. Mr. Gray was the lawyer for the MIA. 12 And the most visible
leader of that organization was a previously unknown young minister
named Martin Luther King, Jr. Mr. Gray was Dr. King’s lawyer for
several years until King moved to Atlanta. 13
While the Rosa Parks case wended its way through the Alabama
court system, Fred Gray filed a separate lawsuit in federal court that
directly challenged the constitutionality of the Montgomery ordinance
and the Alabama statute that required segregation on the buses. 14 The

7.

347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Gray, supra note 1, at 186.

8.

One of Mr. Gray’s law school professors encouraged him to consult with other
lawyers and not to hesitate giving them credit for their help. Gray, supra
note 1, at 17. He has followed that advice consistently. I generally do not
indicate the other lawyers with whom he worked on the cases discussed here,
but the references to his memoir do acknowledge those other lawyers by name.

9.

352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).

10.

Gray, supra note 1, at 49–50, 55–57; see Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92
So. 2d 683, 684 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957).

11.

Gray, supra note 1, at 37 & n.3.

12.

Id. at 52–53.

13.

Id. at 53–54. Mr. Gray declined Dr. King’s invitation to move with him to
Atlanta, preferring to remain in Montgomery to continue his fight against
segregation there. Id. at 145, 155.

14.

Because of the way the prosecutor structured the charges against Mrs. Parks,
her case did not present a clear opportunity for a direct challenge to the
constitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at 56.
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named plaintiffs in Browder v. Gayle 15 included Claudette Colvin,
whose arrest earlier in 1955 for refusing to relinquish her seat nearly
precipitated a mass protest. 16 Rosa Parks deliberately was omitted from
the case in order to preempt any claim that the federal case represented
a collateral attack on her state-court proceedings. 17 The Supreme Court,
in November 1956, summarily affirmed a three-judge district court ruling that the ordinance was unconstitutional, a decision that vindicated
the Montgomery bus boycott and helped to lead to the desegregation
of the buses. 18
B. Freedom of Association: NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson 19

Meanwhile, many segregationists thought that the Montgomery bus
boycott must have been fomented by outside agitators and subversives.
Alabama Attorney General John Patterson, claiming that the NAACP
was a foreign corporation that had not qualified to do business in the
state, demanded that the organization produce the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of all its Alabama members. 20 His theory was
transparent if only implicit: the NAACP was behind the civil rights
movement, helping African Americans gain admission to whites-only
public universities such as the University of Alabama 21 and supporting
the bus boycott as well as other efforts to undermine segregation. If
only the NAACP could be shut down, Alabama’s otherwise contented
Negroes would return to life as usual.
Fred Gray was local counsel to the NAACP throughout the litigation over the state’s effort to prevent it from operating in Alabama.
When the organization refused to surrender its membership records, a
state judge issued a contempt order and imposed a fine of $100,000.
The dispute ultimately went to the Supreme Court, which ruled in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson that the order to disclose the
membership records violated the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that mandatory disclosure of membership information might deter
individuals from joining or remaining in the organization for fear of
physical or economic reprisal, particularly when the identity of the
group’s members had nothing to do with Alabama’s purported interest
15.

142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), aff’d mem., 352 U.S. 903
(1956).

16.

Gray, supra note 1, at 43–45, 72.

17.

Id. at 72.

18.

Id. at 92–95.

19.

357 U.S. 449 (1958).

20.

Gray, supra note 1, at 105–06.

21.

An African-American woman, Autherine Lucy, briefly attended the University of Alabama in 1956. See infra text accompanying notes 84–85.
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in determining whether the NAACP was required to register to do business in the state. 22 This foundational case established important principles about freedom of association and laid the foundation for a series of
later decisions that struck down other efforts to harass or outlaw the
NAACP and other controversial groups. 23
C. Racial Gerrymandering: Gomillion v. Lightfoot 24

Even before the NAACP case reached the Supreme Court, segregationist politicians launched another attack on civil rights by redrawing
the boundaries of Tuskegee, a city with an unusually large proportion
of African-American professionals who worked at Tuskegee Institute
(now Tuskegee University) and a large Veterans Administration hospital that served only black patients during the segregation era. 25 The
gerrymandering law26 transformed the shape of Tuskegee from a square
to what Mr. Gray described as a “25-sided sea dragon” 27 and what the
Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot 28 described as “an uncouth
twenty-eight-sided figure.” 29 This cartographic sleight of hand removed
all but four or five of the approximately 400 African-American voters

22.

Id. at 462–66; Gray, supra note 1, at 107. This ruling did not discourage
Patterson, who was elected governor in November 1958 after a bruising primary against George Wallace, or other state officials. They litigated for six
more years, including three more trips to the Supreme Court, before the
NAACP was allowed to operate there. See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Flowers,
377 U.S. 288, 290–93 (1964) (summarizing subsequent developments); Gray,
supra note 1, at 106.

23.

See, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); see generally Numan V. Bartley,
The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South
During the 1950s, 212–24 (1969); Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil
Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936–
1961, 283–300 (1994); Walter F. Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The
Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. Pol. Q. 371, 374–80, 386–88 (1959).

24.

364 U.S. 339 (1960).

25.

See Gray, supra note 1, at 109.

26.

Act of July 15, 1957, No. 140, 1957 Ala. Acts 185.

27.

Gray, supra note 1, at 113.

28.

364 U.S. 339 (1960). I have discussed this case in considerably more detail
in an article that appeared in another civil rights symposium. See Jonathan
L. Entin, Of Squares and Uncouth Twenty-Eight-Sided Figures: Reflections on
Gomillion v. Lightfoot After Half a Century, 50 Washburn L.J. 133 (2010).

29.

Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340.
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from Tuskegee while leaving every single white voter within the city
limits. 30
Mr. Gray filed Gomillion v. Lightfoot on behalf of many of the excluded voters, but the lawsuit faced a seemingly insurmountable obstacle in the form of the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in Colegrove v.
Green, 31 which had rejected a challenge to the way a state had drawn
its congressional districts as a nonjusticiable political question. So daunting was this obstacle that national NAACP general counsel Robert
Carter, who worked with Gray on both Browder v. Gayle and NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, initially discouraged him from pursuing
the Tuskegee case. 32 Gray eventually persuaded Carter that the lawsuit
could succeed, and the two divided the oral argument in the Supreme
Court. 33
At the very beginning of the Gomillion litigation, Mr. Gray obtained a map showing the Tuskegee city limits before and after passage of
the gerrymandering law. He never got to use the map in the district
court, which dismissed the case on the basis of Colegrove v. Green.34
But he had the map mounted on an easel when he appeared in the
Supreme Court. 35 Scarcely a minute into his argument, he was interrupted by Justice Frankfurter, a stickler for procedure and the author
of the Colegrove opinion. Instead of a professorial scolding about jurisdictional technicalities, Frankfurter asked the twenty-nine-year-old
lawyer to show him the location of Tuskegee Institute. When Gray
pointed to the map showing that the Institute no longer was within the
city limits, the justice was incredulous. 36 Indeed, Frankfurter wrote the
opinion for a unanimous Court striking down the Tuskegee gerrymandering law. Unlike Colegrove, the Tuskegee case involved a complete
denial of the right to vote and therefore did not involve a nonjusticiable
political question. 37 As if to underscore the point, the Court reproduced
Mr. Gray’s map as an appendix to its opinion. 38

30.

Id. at 341; Gray, supra note 1, at 3, 113–14.

31.

328 U.S. 549 (1946).

32.

Gray, supra note 1, at 114–15. Carter’s skepticism seemed well founded
when the case failed in the lower courts. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp.
405 (M.D. Ala. 1958), aff’d, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).

33.

Gray, supra note 1, at 115, 117.

34.

Id. at 116.

35.

Id. at 3, 117–18.

36.

Id. at 4, 118.

37.

Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346–47.

38.

Id. at 348. Mr. Gray also has reproduced the map. See Gray, supra note 1,
at 228.
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Mr. Gray believes that Gomillion v. Lightfoot was his “most important” case. 39 It was the Supreme Court’s first racial gerrymandering
decision, and it has become a leading precedent in the law of voting
rights. It also has figured prominently in equal protection doctrine more
generally, as Alabama’s unsubtle effort to exclude African Americans
from Tuskegee has become a leading example of how to infer discriminatory intent in constitutional cases. 40 Moreover, Gomillion v. Lightfoot
laid a key part of the foundation for Baker v. Carr41 and the long line
of reapportionment decisions that followed from that ruling.
D. Constitutionalizing the Law of Defamation:
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 42

Even before Gomillion was argued in the Supreme Court, yet
another of Mr. Gray’s landmark cases was getting started. On March
29, 1960, less than two months after the first sit-in demonstration in
Greensboro, North Carolina, and not long after Alabama authorities
had indicted Martin Luther King and had him arrested for perjury in
connection with his state income taxes, 43 the New York Times published
a full-page advertisement condemning segregation and seeking political,
moral, and financial support for the civil rights movement. 44 The publication of this advertisement set in motion the events that culminated
in the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.45
Claiming that several statements in the ad defamed him, Montgomery
Police Commissioner L.B. Sullivan filed a libel suit seeking $500,000 in
damages. Sullivan named as defendants the newspaper and four
Alabama ministers whose names appeared in the ad. The inclusion of
Ralph Abernathy, Joseph Lowery, S.S. Seay, Sr., and Fred
Shuttlesworth as parties meant that the case, which arose under Alabama law, would have to proceed in the state courts because the case

39.

Gray, supra note 1, at 119.

40.

See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

41.

369 U.S. 186 (1962). See generally Law Review Symposium 2011: Baker v.
Carr After 50 Years: Appraising the Reapportionment Revolution: Introduction, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 941 (2012).

42.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

43.

Gray, supra note 1, at 146; see infra Part III.B.

44.

Comm. to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the
South, Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25, reprinted in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 App. (1964).

45.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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would not fall under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.46
Fred Gray represented the four ministers. 47
At trial he presented evidence that the names of the ministers had
been included without their knowledge or consent and argued that Sullivan had offered only one slender piece of testimony about their involvement: they had not responded to his letter demanding that they retract
the allegedly defamatory statements in the ad. 48 To that contention
Gray noted that the ministers had nothing to do with the ad and therefore could not “retract that which they had not tracted.” 49 Nevertheless,
the jury quickly returned a verdict for the full $500,000 that Sullivan
had sought. 50
All of the defendants filed timely appeals. Unfortunately, the ministers could not afford to post a supersedeas bond and, for strategic
reasons, the Times would not agree to let them subscribe to its bond.51
This meant that Sullivan could sell their assets to satisfy the judgment
even during the pendency of the appeal. Although successful plaintiffs
customarily did not levy against the property of a defendant before the
conclusion of the appellate process, Sullivan did in fact levy against
property belonging to all of the ministers. 52 Of course, this was no ordinary case: the whole point of the litigation was to punish civil rights
activists 53 and to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the national
press to report on the movement. 54 The Supreme Court recognized the
significance of the case and overturned the judgment, establishing
strong First Amendment protection for critics of public officials. This
ruling provided much of the grounding for modern defamation law. In
order for public officials and public figures to recover, they must prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that a defamatory statement was

46.

Mr. Gray had opened his first law office in space he sublet from Dr. Seay.
Gray, supra note 1, at 28.

47.

Id. at 156. Two other Alabama lawyers, including Solomon S. Seay, Jr., were
part of the ministers’ defense team that Mr. Gray coordinated. Id. at 157.

48.

Id. at 160.

49.

Id. at 160–61.

50.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256; Gray, supra note 1, at 161.

51.

Gray, supra note 1, at 161–62.

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at 162.

54.

Several other Alabama officials also had sued the Times. See Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 278 n.18. The newspaper faced potential liability of $5.6 million in
eleven libel suits, and CBS faced another potential liability of $1.7 million in
five others. Id. at 295 (Black, J., concurring).
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published with actual malice—in other words, with knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard for its truth. 55
Of particular significance, the Court accepted the argument that
Mr. Gray had made at trial: that “there was no evidence whatever”
that the ministers were responsible for any “erroneous statements” in
the ad. 56 On a practical level, this ruling also meant that Sullivan could
not keep the ministers’ property against which he had levied. They
never got back the actual property at issue, but Sullivan did have to
remit the proceeds of the sale of those assets. 57

III. Other Cases
A. The Tuskegee Syphilis Litigation

Mr. Gray’s best-known case that did not reach the Supreme Court
dealt with the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study. 58 This forty-year project was designed to examine the effects of untreated syphilis, but
participants were never told the purpose of the study, never received
accurate information about their health, and never got treatment even
when such treatment was readily available. The lawsuit resulted in a
settlement that provided financial compensation to the living participants and to the heirs of those who had died. 59 And in 1997, President
Bill Clinton formally apologized on behalf of the United States government for what it had done. 60
Beyond this case and the high-profile Supreme Court cases discussed earlier, Fred Gray played an important role in numerous others
that dramatically reshaped Alabama. Some of them had significant implications for more general legal developments, paving the way for later
Supreme Court decisions and for cases elsewhere in the nation. They

55.

Id. at 279–80, 285–86. The Sullivan case dealt only with public officials,
but the actual-malice rule soon was extended to public figures. See Curtis
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

56.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286.

57.

Gray, supra note 1, at 163.

58.

See Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (denying
defendants’ motions for summary judgment on most federal claims); Pollard
v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 646 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (awarding attorneys’ fees
following settlement). Mr. Gray has written his own account of that case.
Fred D. Gray, The Tuskegee Syphilis Study (2013). For other accounts,
see James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment
(new and expanded ed. 1993); Susan M. Reverby, Examining Tuskegee:
The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy (2009).

59.

Gray, supra note 1, at 300.

60.

Id. at 367.
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involved sit-in demonstrators, Freedom Riders, the desegregation of
public schools and universities, and voting rights.
B. The Perjury Trial of Martin Luther King

Martin Luther King moved to Atlanta in late 1959, but the Alabama authorities continued their effort to discredit him. Acting at the
behest of John Patterson, who by then had become governor, 61 the prosecutor in Montgomery indicted Dr. King for perjury in connection with
his 1956 and 1958 state income tax returns. 62 This apparently was the
first time that anyone in Alabama ever had been charged with a felony
in connection with alleged tax evasion. 63 Moreover, state authorities
took the public step of having him arrested in Atlanta instead of quietly
notifying him of charge so that he could arrange to return discreetly to
post bond as was customary in many criminal cases. 64
The perjury charge threatened to destroy Dr. King’s credibility as
the moral leader of the civil rights movement by portraying him as a
selfish, dishonest con man who was enriching himself at the expense of
gullible supporters. 65 As noted earlier, the advertisement that gave rise
to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan sought to raise funds at least in
part to support his legal defense in the perjury case. 66 Fred Gray coordinated the legal team that represented Dr. King in the perjury case.67
The lawyers meticulously presented their defense, but mindful of the
verdict against the ministers at Commissioner Sullivan’s trial they were
not entirely confident that the jurors would decide the case on the evidence. 68 Much to their surprise and relief, the all-white jury returned a
verdict of not guilty. 69 That verdict enabled Dr. King to retain his
credibility. It also might account for why this potentially devastating
trial has fallen into relative obscurity despite its danger to Dr. King
and the civil rights movement. 70

61.

See supra note 22.

62.

Gray, supra note 1, at 146.

63.

Id. at 147.

64.

Id. at 146.

65.

Id. at 147–48.

66.

See supra text accompanying notes 43–44.

67.

Gray, supra note 1, at 149.

68.

See id. at 152–54.

69.

Id. at 154.

70.

Id. Perhaps that helps to explain why this episode has received such limited
scholarly attention. For more detailed discussion, see Edgar Dyer, A
“Triumph of Justice” in Alabama: The 1960 Perjury Trial of Martin Luther
King, Jr., 88 J. Afr.-Am. Hist. 245 (2003); Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Martin
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C. Sit-In Demonstrators

The King perjury trial was not the only case that grew out of events
discussed in the advertisement that gave rise to New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan. One of the statements at issue in the ad related to the
expulsion of several Alabama State students in connection with a civil
rights demonstration. The ad mistakenly said that the demonstration
had taken place on the steps of the state capitol when in fact the students had held a sit-in at a lunch counter in the county courthouse.71
This demonstration took place in late February 1960, one of the hundreds of similar protests that were inspired by the Greensboro sit-in at
the beginning of the month. 72 Although the students were not arrested,
the college president yielded to pressure from Governor Patterson and
expelled the students. 73
Mr. Gray filed suit in federal court, claiming that the expulsions
without notice or hearing deprived the students of due process of law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education, 74 ruled that the vital importance of
education meant that the state could not arbitrarily dismiss, for disciplinary reasons, a student who otherwise was in good standing. Carefully limiting its ruling to cases involving misbehavior as opposed to
unsatisfactory academic performance, the court explained that the institution had to provide the students with specific notice of the charges
against them and an opportunity for at least a rudimentary adversarial
proceeding before expelling them. 75
This decision had profound implications. 76 It marked the first time
that a court had held that students at public colleges and universities
had a sufficiently strong interest in obtaining an education that procedural due process required a hearing before they could be dismissed for
misbehavior. The Supreme Court later described Dixon as a “landmark
decision” when it found that public school students also enjoyed due
process protection that entitled them to some kind of hearing before
being suspended or expelled. 77

Luther King’s Perjury Trial: A Potential Turning Point and a Footnote to
History, 5 Ind. J.L. & Soc. Equality 237 (2017).
71.

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 259 (1964).

72.

See Gray, supra note 1, at 165–66.

73.

Id. at 166–67.

74.

294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).

75.

Id. at 158–59.

76.

See Gray, supra note 1, at 168–69.

77.

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975).
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But Dixon had even broader significance. Existing doctrine reflected
the right-privilege distinction: due process required a pre-deprivation
hearing only when a constitutional right was at stake, and courts had
defined rights narrowly; interests that did not rise to the level of constitutional rights were treated as privileges that were not subject to due
process protections. 78 Although the Supreme Court had expressed ambivalence about the rigidity of the right-privilege distinction when Dixon
arose, it would be another decade before the Court formally abandoned
that approach. And the justices invoked Dixon when they finally did
so. 79
D. Freedom Riders

When the Freedom Riders reached Montgomery in May 1961, Fred
Gray helped to represent them. A mob of white rioters attacked the
riders when they arrived at the local Greyhound bus station. 80 After
this group continued on their trip several days later, another group,
including Ralph Abernathy and Yale University chaplain William Sloan
Coffin, was arrested at the Trailways terminal while seeking service at
the whites-only lunch counter. Mr. Gray took a leading role in the litigation arising from these events. 81 First, he handled the criminal cases
in the Alabama courts. Although the defendants were found guilty at
trial, the Supreme Court eventually overturned the convictions. 82 Meanwhile, he also obtained an injunction directing Greyhound, Trailways,
and their affiliates to operate their buses and terminals on a desegregated basis. 83
E. Desegregation of Public Education

Alabama implacably resisted desegregation of public education at
any level. An African-American student attended the University of Alabama for a few days in February 1956. Autherine Lucy applied while
Fred Gray was still in law school and was admitted in February 1956
pursuant to a court order that the state litigated all the way to the
78.

As Justice Holmes famously put it in a case involving a police officer who
was fired for engaging in political activity: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).

79.

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.9 (1970); see also Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969) (citing Dixon
in establishing that public school students enjoy free speech rights).

80.

Gray, supra note 1, at 173–75.

81.

Id. at 175–78.

82.

Abernathy v. State, 155 So. 2d 586 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962), rev’d mem., 380
U.S. 447 (1965).

83.

Lewis v. Greyhound Corp., 199 F. Supp. 210 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
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Supreme Court. 84 Segregationists rioted against her presence on campus, and she was first suspended (supposedly for her own safety) and
then expelled (supposedly for criticism that she and her lawyers made
of the university’s handling of the situation). 85 Otherwise, as late as
1963 not a single public school or university in the state had begun to
desegregate. Mr. Gray played a major role in ending segregation in
those institutions.
His efforts began with his work on behalf of Vivian Malone and
James Hood; she would become the University of Alabama’s first
African-American graduate. They were admitted to the university in
June 1963 pursuant to another federal court order, but not before Governor George Wallace’s notorious “stand in the schoolhouse door” as an
act of symbolic defiance. 86 A few months later, Mr. Gray helped to
obtain an injunction that led to the admission of Harold Franklin as
the first African-American student at Auburn University. 87
Mr. Gray also played a significant part in a series of cases that
sought to desegregate public elementary and secondary schools around
the state. 88 The most important of these lawsuits involved Macon County, where Governor Wallace intervened to prevent local authorities
from complying with a federal court order to desegregate the Tuskegee
schools. 89 Wallace’s intervention proved to be a colossal legal blunder,
because it afforded Mr. Gray the opportunity to add the governor as a
defendant and led ultimately to an injunction requiring the desegregation of all public schools throughout Alabama. 90

84.

Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala.), aff’d per curiam, 228 F.2d
619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956). The lawsuit seeking
Ms. Lucy’s admission to the university was filed in 1953; the legal process
leading to her matriculation consumed the better part of three years. See E.
Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door 39 (1993); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts 225 (1994); Gray, supra note 1, at 186.

85.

See United States v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. 1137, 1141–42 (N.D. Ala. 1985),
rev’d on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987). See generally Clark,
supra note 84, at 53–104.

86.

Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff’d per curiam sub nom.
McCorvey v. Lucy, 328 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1964); Gray, supra note 1, at
187–88. See generally Clark, supra note 84, at 145–237.

87.

Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. Supp. 724 (M.D. Ala. 1963), aff’d per curiam as
modified, 331 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964); Gray, supra note 1, at 191–92.

88.

See Gray, supra note 1, at 198–203.

89.

Id. at 203–12; see Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D.
Ala. 1964) (three-judge court).

90.

Gray, supra note 1, at 209–10; see Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F.
Supp. 458, 480 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (three-judge court), aff’d mem. sub nom.
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
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He also took a leading role in a desegregation case involving public
schools in Montgomery that led to another major decision. Mr. Gray
obtained an order requiring that the public schools begin desegregation
in the fall of 1964. 91 But desegregation of faculty lagged far behind.
Accordingly, he returned to court in Carr v. Montgomery County Board
of Education. 92 The district court imposed specific numerical hiring
goals and timetables for each school in the district. 93 Although the court
of appeals thought that this approach was overly rigid, 94 the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the district court’s remedial order. 95 This
landmark ruling authorized courts to use goals and timetables as a remedy for racial discrimination, a principle that the high court itself has
endorsed in several subsequent cases that relied on the Montgomery
County ruling. 96
F. Voting Rights

The Tuskegee gerrymandering case, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 97 protected the right of African Americans to vote. But that case was only
one of Fred Gray’s contributions to voting rights law. He played a central role in the litigation surrounding the Selma-Montgomery march
that helped to pave the way for passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 98 and he filed two of the earliest and most consequential lawsuits
under that new law.

91.

Carr v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
That ruling required the desegregation of the first, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth
grades in 1964. Id. at 709. The court subsequently ordered the desegregation
of all grades by the fall of 1967. Carr v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 253
F. Supp. 306, 307 (M.D. Ala. 1966). The subsequent order also directed that
the board of education take steps to desegregate the faculty in all schools.
See id. at 310.

92.

289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d as modified, 400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1968), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 395
U.S. 225 (1969).

93.

Id. at 654. See Gray, supra note 1, at 202.

94.

Carr, 400 F.2d at 7–8.

95.

Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. at 235.

96.

See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 180 n.30 (1987) (desegregation of state police department); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l
Ass’n v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 478 U.S. 421, 450 n.27 (1986)
(alleviation of discriminatory labor union membership policies); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1971) (desegregation
of public schools).

97.

See supra Part II.C.

98.

Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–
10702 (2012)).
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Following the events of Bloody Sunday at the Edmund Pettus
Bridge in Selma, civil rights advocates promised that they would complete the march to Montgomery that state and local law enforcement
officers had so brutally suppressed. On March 8, 1965, the day after
Bloody Sunday, Fred Gray filed suit in federal district court seeking an
order requiring Governor Wallace and other officials to permit the
march to proceed. 99 In Williams v. Wallace, 100 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a preliminary injunction directing state and local authorities not only to allow the march
but also to protect the marchers, and it also approved the detailed plans
for the route of the demonstration. 101
After the Voting Rights Act was adopted, due in no small measure
to the Selma-Montgomery march, Fred Gray filed two of the earliest
lawsuits under the new law. The first of these cases, Sellers v.
Trussell, 102 helped to establish the principle that proof of a disparate
impact on a protected class could establish a statutory violation. 103 The
dispute arose when the Alabama legislature extended the four-year
terms of some incumbent county commissioners to six years. That move
prevented African Americans in that county from voting for those positions for two more years and kept in place commissioners who had been
elected when blacks were not allowed to cast ballots, so the extension
of the incumbents’ terms had a discriminatory effect. 104
Mr. Gray’s other case was the first vote-dilution suit brought under
the Voting Rights Act and paved the way for numerous others. 105 Smith
99.

Gray, supra note 1, at 216.

100. 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). For a discussion of the broader First
Amendment implications of this decision, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis,
104 Yale L.J. 1411 (1995).
101. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 108, 110; id. at 120–21; see Gray, supra note 1,
at 216–17. The court of appeals denied the state’s emergency motion for a
stay of the district court’s order. Williams v. Wallace, 10 Race Rel. L. Rep.
230 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 1965); see Gray, supra note 1, at 217 (detailing the
hectic trip to New Orleans for an expedited hearing on the state’s request of
a stay). Mr. Gray and his wife also hosted most of the march leaders in their
home for a meeting to draw up the plans for the fifth and final day of the
march, and he was among the delegates who met with Governor Wallace in
the state capitol in a fruitless effort to persuade him to support voting rights
for African Americans. Id. at 218–19.
102. 253 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge court).
103. See Gray, supra note 1, at 246–47. The Supreme Court endorsed this
principle under Title VII five years later. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
104. Sellers, 253 F. Supp. at 917.
105. Gray, supra note 1, at 249–50.
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v. Paris 106 challenged a change to the system for electing members of
the Democratic Party executive committee in George Wallace’s home
county. 107 For many years, the overwhelming majority of committee
members were elected from districts, which were referred to as beats.
Many African Americans registered to vote for the first time after the
passage of the Voting Rights Act. Several African-Americans who lived
in majority-black beats ran for seats on the executive committee. The
party thereupon adopted a system of at-large election for all executive
committee members. Although the African-American candidates won
in their beats, they lost the at-large contest to white candidates in a
county with a large majority of white voters who refused to vote for
black candidates. 108 This sequence of events, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama concluded, provided compelling evidence of a discriminatory purpose to dilute the votes of African
Americans. 109 This scheme of vote dilution therefore was unlawful. 110

IV. The Symposium
Fred Gray has spoken many times at our law school and at the
university. He has been a member of the board of trustees and has
received numerous tributes, including an honorary degree from the university in 1992 and the Centennial Medal, the law school’s highest
award, in 1993. 111 He also is no stranger to the pages of this journal.112
But the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review decided to
conduct a daylong symposium focusing on Fred Gray’s extraordinary
legal career. That symposium took place on October 14, 2016. This issue
contains articles that were presented on that occasion. 113

106. 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified and aff’d per curiam, 386 F.2d
979 (5th Cir. 1967).
107. Gray, supra note 1, at 249–50.
108. Smith, 257 F. Supp. at 903.
109. Id. at 904.
110. Id. at 905. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit fully
endorsed the district court’s reasoning, but modified the remedy to take
effect sooner than the lower court had ordered. Id. at 980.
111. See Gray, supra note 1, at 400. Indeed, on the day of this symposium the
university conferred its Distinguished Alumnus Award on Mr. Gray.
112. See Fred D. Gray, The Sullivan Case: A Direct Product of the Civil Rights
Movement, 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1223 (1992); Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride
to Justice: A Conversation with Fred Gray (Introduction by Jonathan L.
Entin), 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 733 (2014).
113. A video recording of the entire symposium is available online. Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, In Honor of Fred Gray: Making Civil
Rights Law from Rosa Parks to the 21st Century, YouTube (Oct. 14, 2016),
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David Garrow, eminent historian of the civil rights movement,114
begins the symposium by placing Mr. Gray’s work on the Montgomery
bus boycott into broader perspective. 115 Professor Garrow explains the
background to that famous protest, including the role of the Women’s
Political Council and its leaders who helped to mobilize and implement
the boycott. In the process, he shows how Mr. Gray went beyond litigating on behalf of Rosa Parks and those who directly challenged the
constitutionality of Montgomery’s segregation ordinance to providing
vital behind-the-scenes leadership that helped to make the boycott
effective.
The next three articles address various aspects of school desegregation. Kevin Brown focuses on the fear of interracial sexual relations
that lay at the heart of the justification for segregation, especially in
educational institutions. 116 He notes that the Supreme Court first endorsed school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education, 117 promoted
school desegregation in a series of subsequent rulings, 118 then limited
the scope of remedies in school desegregation cases, 119 and finally loosened the standards for finding that previously segregated districts had
attained unitary status. 120 Professor Brown also traces the evolution of
attitudes toward interracial sexual relationships from colonial times to
the present and suggests not only that a connection exists between the
effort to desegregate public education and the acceptance of such relationships, but also that the growing acceptance has persisted even as
the courts have withdrawn their engagement with school desegregation.
Next, Wendy Parker traces the process of school desegregation in
Alabama through a careful examination of Lee v. Macon County Board
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3T1MHjFBwI [https://perma.cc/
55PN-A2UZ].
114. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King,
Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (1986);
David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (1978); see also Jo Ann Gibson
Robinson, The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who
Started It (David J. Garrow ed., 1987).
115. David Garrow, In Honor of Fred Gray: Making Civil Rights Law, 67 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 1045 (2017).
116. Kevin Brown, The Enduring Integration School Desegregation Helped to
Produce, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1055 (2017).
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1969).
119. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
120. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237 (1991).
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of Education, 121 the long-running litigation in which Fred Gray has
played such a prominent role. 122 Professor Parker documents the progress in desegregation throughout the state but also analyzes the persistence of racial inequality and disparity in Alabama schools, concluding
with a thoughtful meditation about the uses and limitations of litigation
as a means of effecting social reform.
Natasha Strassfeld builds on Professor Parker’s concern about continuing racial disparities by examining the persistent disproportion in
the placement of African American students in special education even
after schools nominally have been desegregated. 123 This phenomenon,
like tracking and ability grouping, can promote segregation within
schools and reinforce racial isolation in communities and the nation as
a whole. She also analyzes efforts to combat significantly disproportionate placement of students of color in special education classes as
well as administrative efforts to address the practice.
Two other articles focus on race and health care, building on the
lessons of the Tuskegee syphilis scandal. Jonathan Kahn addresses the
intersection of race and patent law. 124 Specifically, he focuses on the
growing trend of granting regulatory approval of and patent protection
for drugs that are promoted for use in patients of a particular race.
Professor Kahn strongly criticizes this development and raises both
normative and scientific objections to incorporating race as an explicit
aspect of the medical system.
Then Ruqaiijah Yearby builds directly on the lessons of the Tuskegee syphilis study by examining the extent to which economically
disadvantaged minority children are exploited in medical research studies and the relationship between this exploitation and their access to
health care more generally. 125 Specifically, she advocates a reformulation
of the bioethical principle of justice to include a requirement that researchers provide a benefit to the population from which the research
subjects are drawn.
The final portion of the symposium addresses more general issues.
Leonard Rubinowitz uses the concept of courage as a lens for understanding the work of Fred Gray and other civil rights lawyers who put
121. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
122. Wendy Parker, Why Alabama School Desegregation Succeeded (and Failed),
67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1091 (2017).
123. Natasha M. Strassfeld, The Future of IDEA: Monitoring Disproportionate
Representation of Minority Students in Special Education and Intentional
Discrimination Claims, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1121 (2017).
124. Jonathan Kahn, Revisiting Racial Patents in an Era of Precision Medicine,
67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1153 (2017).
125. Ruqaiijah Yearby, Exploitation in Medical Research: Forty Years After the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1171 (2017).
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their safety and sometimes even their lives at risk in their work. 126 In
addition to Mr. Gray, Professor Rubinowitz discusses Arthur Shores,
the dean of black Alabama lawyers; Clifford Durr, a white Alabamian;
Robert Carter, the general counsel of the NAACP; and Constance
Baker Motley, associate counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. Courage for these purposes involves both professional
and physical aspects, and Professor Rubinowitz explores all aspects of
this subject in relation to these five different but significant lawyers.
My concluding article seeks to pick up on many of the themes addressed by the other authors and also to relate Fred Gray’s remarkable
career to broader debates about the utility of law as a vehicle for social
reform. 127 Mr. Gray’s work demonstrates that the role of a truly superior
lawyer defies easy categorization. No doubt, he is an excellent litigator,
but he also understands that winning a lawsuit is only the first step in
a complex process and that the law is a means to an end for clients and
others.
This was an extraordinary symposium. Like any extraordinary program, many persons made it possible. Deans Jessica Berg and Michael
Scharf of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law enthusiastically supported this project from the instant that they heard about it.
Their support went well beyond financial; they also made sure that
everything went smoothly at every step of the process.
Thanks also to the Case Western Reserve Law Review for sponsoring the symposium and publishing these articles. Executive Symposium
Editor Chad Aronson, Editor-in-Chief Sean Sweeney, and all of the
other members of the Law Review have performed well beyond the call
of duty.
Behind the scenes, Nancy Pratt and her staff made sure that the
symposium appeared to be perfectly choreographed, even when they
had to bail us out when we overlooked details that could have derailed
the whole program.
Finally, Fred Gray graced us with his presence and his illuminating
comments throughout the program and provided the reason for the
symposium. Thank you, Fred, for everything.

126. Leonard S. Rubinowitz, The Courage of Civil Rights Lawyers: Fred Gray
and His Colleagues, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1227 (2017).
127. Jonathan L. Entin, Fred Gray and the Role of Civil Rights Lawyers, 67 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 1277 (2017).
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